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Abstract The Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox is typically taken to highlight a tension
between our intuition that certain conditional probabilities with respect to probability
zero conditioning events are well defined and the mathematical definition of condi-
tional probability by Bayes’ formula, which loses its meaning when the conditioning
event has probability zero. We argue in this paper that the theory of conditional expec-
tations is the proper mathematical device to conditionalize and that this theory allows
conditionalizationwith respect to probability zero events. The conditional probabilities
on probability zero events in the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox also can be calculated
using conditional expectations. The alleged clash arising from the fact that one obtains
different values for the conditional probabilities on probability zero events depending
on what conditional expectation one uses to calculate them is resolved by showing that
the different conditional probabilities obtained using different conditional expectations
cannot be interpreted as calculating in different parametrizations of the conditional
probabilities of the same event with respect to the same conditioning conditions. We
conclude that there is no clash between the correct intuition about what the conditional
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probabilities with respect to probability zero events are and the technically proper
concept of conditionalization via conditional expectations—the Borel–Kolmogorov
Paradox is just a pseudo-paradox.
Keywords Conditionalization · Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox ·
Interpretation of probability
“The concepts of conditional probability and expected value with respect to a σ -field underlie much of
modem probability theory. The difficulty in understanding these ideas has to do not with mathematical
detail so much as with probabilistic meaning...” (Billingsley 1995, p. 427)
1 The Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox and the main claim of the paper
Suppose we choose a point randomly with respect to the distribution given by the
uniform measure on the surface of the unit sphere in three dimension. What is the
conditional probability that a randomly chosen point is on an arc of a great circle on
the sphere on condition that the point lies on that great circle? Since a great circle
has measure zero in the surface measure on the sphere, the Bayes’ formula cannot be
used to calculate the conditional probability in question. On the other hand one has the
intuition that the conditional probability of the randomly chosen point lying on an arc
is well defined and is proportional to the length of the arc. This tension between the
“ratio analysis” (Bayes’ formula) of conditional probability and our intuition is known
as the Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox. The tension seems to be aggravated by the fact
that different attempts to replace the Bayes’ formula by other, apparently reasonable,
methods to calculate the conditional probability in question lead to different values.
The Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox has been discussed both in mathematical works
on probability theory proper (Kolmogorov 1933, pp. 50–51; Billingsley 1995, p. 441;
de Finetti 1972, p. 203; Proschan and Presnell 1998; Rao 1988; Rao 2005, p. 65;
Seidenfeld et al. 2001), and in the literature on philosophy of probability (Borel 1909,
pp. 100–104; Easwaran 2008; Hájek 2003; Jaynes 2003, p. 470; Howson 2014;
Myrvold 2014; Rescorla 2014; Seidenfeld 2001). One can discern two main attitudes
towards the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox: a radical and a conservative.
According to radical views, the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox poses a serious threat
for the standard measure theoretic formalism of probability theory, in which condi-
tional probability is a defined concept, and this is regarded as justification for attempts
at axiomatizations of probability theory inwhich the conditional probability is taken as
the primitive rather than a defined notion (Hájek 2003; Harper 1975; Fraassen 1976).
Such axiomatizations have been given byPopper (1938, 1955, 1995), andRényi (1955)
(see Makinson 2011 for a recent analysis of Rényi’s and Popper’s approach).
According to “conservative” papers the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox just makes
explicit an insufficiency in naïve conditioning that can be avoided within the mea-
sure theoretic framework by formulating the problem of conditioning properly and
carefully. Once this is done, the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox is resolved. Kolmogorov
himself took this latter position (Kolmogorov 1933, pp. 50–51). Billingsley (1995,
p. 441), Proschan and Presnell (1998, p. 249) and Rao (1988, p. 441) write about
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the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox in the same spirit (Proschan and Presnell call the
Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox the “equivalent event fallacy”).
The present paper falls into the conservative group: We claim that the Borel–
Kolmogorov Paradox is in perfect harmony with measure theoretic probability theory,
if one uses conditional expectations as the conditioning device to define conditional
probabilities. But we go substantially beyond the treatment of the paradox in the con-
servative papers in several important respects. We also display what we think are
the problematic reasonings and interpretations in the “radical papers”, which we see
as the main reason why the radical papers take a radical position about the insuffi-
ciency of conditionalization in the framework of Kolmogorovian probability theory.
The main points in our paper about why and how the paradox disappears naturally
from the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox if one treats it in the spirit of measure theoretic
probability theory can be summarized as follows.
Conservative assessments of the status of the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox (for
instance Kolmogorov’s resolution Kolmogorov 1933 and Billingsley’s short presenta-
tion Billingsley 1995) typically just state that one can obtain a conditional probability
on a great circle using the theory of conditional expectations if one specifies the condi-
tioningσ -field to be the one defined by (measurable sets of)meridian circles containing
the great circle. But this fact, in and by itself, cannot be considered as a complete expla-
nation of how and why the paradox disappears from the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox,
for two reasons. One is that conditional expectations are determined by conditioning
σ -fields up to measure zero only. Hence, the conditional probabilities defined by the
conditional expectation determined by the σ -field specified by the meridians leave
the conditional probability undefined on any single great circle—only on great circles
forming a non-measure zero set in the surface measure are the conditional distribution
determined this way. We will argue however that the product structure of the prob-
ability space formed by the sphere with its surface measure together with a special
location of the conditioning σ -field with respect to the product structure single out a
particular version of the conditional expectation that yields conditional distribution
on all great circles.
The other reason is that it is an essential part of the Borel paradox that the “intu-
itively correct” conditional probability on the great circle which the Bayes’ rule cannot
provide is the uniform one, and the conditional probability determined by the σ -field
defined by the meridian circles is not uniform. Papers such as Jaynes (2003), Rescorla
(2014), Myrvold (2014) and Howson (2014) do recall a derivation of the uniform
conditional probability on the great circle, and we will show how one can obtain this
“intuitively correct” uniform distribution on great circles by choosing a conditioning
σ -field and a version of the corresponding conditional expectation. Being aware of the
fact that the non-uniform conditional probability also can and has been derived, the
papers Jaynes (2003), Rescorla (2014), Myrvold (2014) and Howson (2014) see the
“Description-Relativity Worry” Howson (2014, p. 8) emerge, namely the worry that
the conditional probability of events depends on how one describes the random events.
We will argue that the Description Relativity Worry is unjustified because it is based
on an all-too casual understanding of what the description-(in)dependence of proba-
bilities is.We give a careful analysis of the concept of “re-coordinatization” of random
events and of the concept of “re-parametrization” of probability measure spaces, and
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we prove that the uniform and non-uniform conditional probabilities obtained using
different conditional expectations cannot be interpreted as calculating in different
parametrizations of the conditional probabilities of the same events with respect to the
same conditioning conditions. A crucial element in this proof is showing explicitly that
the σ -fields that determine the conditional expectations yielding different conditional
probability distributions on the great circle are non-isomorphic but a properly defined
re-coordinatization of a probability space describing a random phenomenon entails
isomorphism of the respective σ -fields.
Defusing the Description Relativity Worry does not resolve the tension, however,
between the uniform and non-uniform conditional probabilities: it seems that the
uniform conditional probability is the intuitively correct conditional probability on
a great circle, whereas the non-uniform is not. We will argue however that both are
(or rather: can be) intuitively correct. The argument is based on specifying concepts
and reasonings as probabilistic if they are invariant with respect to isomorphisms of
probability measure spaces, and non-probabilistic if they are not invariant. Using this
distinction we try to make explicit the reasons why one may have the intuition that
the uniform length measure on the arc is the correct conditional probability on a great
circle. We claim that this intuition is fallacious; although it is typically not questioned
in the philosophical literature on the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox. The error in the
intuition is the lack of clean separation of probabilistic and non-probabilistic concepts
and reasoning: The intuition that the uniform distribution is the correct one is based on
(tacit) symmetry considerations. We will see how these can be made mathematically
precise and explicit butwe claim they are not invariantwith respect tomeasure theoretic
isomorphisms of the probability space occurring in the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox.
We will conclude that there is nothing paradoxical in the Borel–Kolmogorov
Paradox; hence, although one might in principle have good reasons to develop an
axiomatization of probability based on the concept of conditional probability as prim-
itive notion, the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox is not one of them.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 is a concise review of the
notion of conditional expectation and the concept of conditional probability defined
via conditional expectations. Section 3 describes the conditional expectation in the
case when the set of elementary events are the points of the two dimensional unit
square with the Lebesgue measure on the square giving the probabilities and when
the conditioning Boolean subalgebra is the σ -field generated by the measurable sets
of one-dimensional slices of the square. This example is a simplified version of the
Borel–Kolmogorov situation without the technical complication resulting from the
non-trivial geometry of the sphere; hence the main idea of how one should treat
conditional probabilities in the Borel–Kolmogorov situation in terms of conditional
expectations can be illustrated on this example with a minimal amount of technicality.
Section 4 calculates the “intuitively correct” uniform conditional distribution on a great
circle by choosing a particular σ -field in the Borel–Kolmogorov situation. Section 5
calculates the “intuitively problematic” conditional distribution on great circles that
are meridian circles with respect to fixed North and South Poles by using conditional
expectations defined by the σ -field determined by measurable sets of these meridian
circles. (Details of these calculations are given in the Appendix section.) Section 6
shows that these different conditional distributions do not stand in contradiction; in
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particular, it is shown that they cannot, hence should not, be considered as conditional
probabilities obtained via different parametrization of the same event with respect to
the same conditioning conditions. Section 7 attempts to display the possible roots of
the fallacious intuition that only the uniform distribution on great circles is the correct
conditional probability. We close the paper by some general comments and specific
remarks on Kolmogorov’s resolution of the paradox (Sect. 8).
2 Conditional expectation and conditioning
We fix some notation that will be used throughout the paper. (X,S, p) denotes a
probability measure space: X is the set of elementary events, S is a σ -field of some
subsets of X , p is a probability measure on S. The negation of event A ∈ S is denoted
by A⊥.
Given (X,S, p), the set of p-integrable functions is denoted by L1(X,S, p); ele-
ments of this function space are the integrable random variables. The characteristic
(indicator) functions χA of the sets A ∈ S are inL1(X,S, p) for all A. The probability
measure p defines a linear functional φp on L1(X,S, p) given by the integral:
φp( f )
.=
∫
X
f dp f ∈ L1(X,S, p) (1)
The map f → ‖ f ‖1 .= φp(| f |) defines a seminorm ‖ · ‖1 on L1(X,S, p) (only
a seminorm because in the function space L1(X,S, p) functions differing on p-
probability zero sets are not identified). The linear functional φp is continuous in
the seminorm ‖ · ‖1.
For more details on the above notions (and other mathematical concepts used here
without definition) see the standard references for the measure theoretic probability
theory (Loéve 1963; Billingsley 1995; Rosenthal 2006; Bogachev 2007). Section 19
in Billingsley (1995) discusses further properties of the function space L1(X,S, p).
2.1 Conditional expectation illustrated on the simplest case
Let (X,S, p) be a probability space and assume A ∈ S is such that p(A), p(A⊥) = 0.
When one conditionalizes with respect to A using the Bayes’ rule
p(B|A) = p(B ∩ A)
p(A)
(2)
one also (tacitly) conditionalizes on A⊥ because the number
p(B|A⊥) = p(B ∩ A
⊥)
p(A⊥)
(3)
also is well defined. Thus, one always conditionalizes not just on the single event A
but on the four-element Boolean subalgebra A of S:
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A .= {∅, A, A⊥, X} (4)
One can keep track of both of the conditional probabilities (2)–(3) by defining amap T
that assigns to the characteristic function χB of B ∈ S another function T χB defined
by
T χB
.= p(B ∩ A)
p(A)
χA + p(B ∩ A
⊥)
p(A⊥)
χA⊥ (5)
T takes its value in L1(X,A, pA), where pA is the restriction of p to A. Since
L1(X,S, p) is the closure of the linear combinations of characteristic functions, T
can be extended linearly from the characteristic functions ofL1(X,S, p) to the whole
L1(X,S, p). Denote the extension by E (· | A).
The upshot: The conditionalizations (2)–(3) defined by the Bayes’ rule define a
linear map
E (· | A) : L1(X,S, p) → L1(X,A, pA) (6)
The function E (· | A) has the following properties:
(i) For all f ∈ L1(X,S, p), the E ( f |A) is A-measurable.
(ii) E (· | A) preserves the integration:
∫
Z
E ( f | A)dpA =
∫
Z
f dp ∀Z ∈ A (7)
Definition 1 E (· | A) is called the A-conditional expectation from L1(X,S, p) to
L1(X,A, pA).
Note that the A-conditional expectation E (· | A) is a map between function spaces,
not a probability measure and not the expectation value of any random variable. These
latter concepts can be easily recovered from T , see below.
2.2 Conditionalization as Bayesian statistical inference illustrated on the
simplest case
We argue in this subsection that the proper way of viewing the standard conditional-
ization (i.e. Bayes’ formula) is to interpret it as (a special case of) Bayesian statistical
inference, and that to treat general Bayesian statistical inference, conditional expec-
tations are an indispensable concept.
Let (X,S, p) be a probability space and A ∈ S such that p(A) = 0. The conditional
probability p(B|A) given by Bayes’ rule defines another probability measure q on S:
q(B)
.= p(B|A) = p(B ∩ A)
p(A)
∀B ∈ S (8)
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The conditional probability measure q obviously has the feature that its restriction to
the Boolean subalgebra A = {∅, A, A⊥, X} has specific values on A and A⊥:
q(A) = 1 (9)
q(A⊥) = 0 (10)
Thus the valuesq(B)of the conditional probabilitymeasureq on elements B ∈ S, B /∈
A given by (8) can be viewed as values of the extension toS of the probability measure
on A that takes on the specific values (9)–(10) on A. To formulate this differently: the
definition of conditional probability by Bayes’ rule is an answer to the question: If a
probability measure is given on A that has the values (9)–(10), what is its extension
from A to S? This is a particular case of the problem of statistical inference: One can
replace the prescribed specific values (9)–(10) by more general ones and ask the same
question: Suppose one is given a probability measure qA on A:
qA(A) = rA (11)
qA(A⊥) = rA⊥ = 1 − rA (12)
What is the extension q of qA from A to S? Formulated differently: what are the
conditional probabilities q(B) of events B ∈ S, B /∈ A on condition that the
probabilities q(A) of events A ∈ A are fixed and are equal to qA(A)? This is a
special case of the problem of statistical inference [see Marchand (1977, 1981) and
Marchand (1982) for a detailed discussion of statistical inference and conditionaliza-
tion].
In general, there is no unique answer to this question, there exist many extensions.
Bayesian statistical inference, which is based on the standard notion of conditional
probability given byBayes’ formula, is one particular answer. This answer presupposes
a background probability measure p on S with respect to which the conditional prob-
abilities q(B) are inferred from qA. To formulate the Bayesian answer properly, one
has to re-formulate the question of statistical inference in terms of functional analysis
as follows: let ψA be the continuous linear functional on L1(X,A, pA) determined
by qA (cf. Equation (1)).
Problem of statistical inference:Given the continuous linear functionalψA onL1(X,
A, pA), what is the extension of ψA from L1(X,A, pA) to a continuous linear func-
tional ψ on L1(X,S, p)?
The Bayesian answer:
Definition 2 (Bayesian inference—elementary case). Let the extension ψ be
ψ( f )
.= ψA(E ( f | A)) ∀ f ∈ L1(X,S, p) (13)
where E (· | A) is the A-conditional expectation from L1(X,S, p) to L1(X,A, pA).
Note thatψA needs anA-measurable function as input, andE (· | A) is a continuous
linear function that takes any S-measurable function to an A-measurable function, so
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it makes sense putting them together in (13) to obtain the continuous linear functional
that we want. Also note that one has to show/argue that definition (13) does indeed
yield an extension of ψA that is continuous—see the general case in Sect. 2.4.
Remark 1 The above stipulation of Bayesian statistical inference contains the usual
Bayesian conditioning of a probability measure: If in (11)–(12) we demand (9)–(10);
i.e. that rA = 1, rA⊥ = 0, then for characteristic functions χB ∈ L1(X,S, p), B ∈ S,
we have:
q(B) = ψ(χB) (14)
= ψA(E (χB | A)) =
∫
X
E (χB | A)dqA (15)
=
∫
X
[ p(B ∩ A)
p(A)
χA + p(B ∩ A
⊥)
p(A⊥)
χA⊥
]
dqA (16)
= p(B ∩ A)
p(A)
∫
X
χAdqA + p(B ∩ A
⊥)
p(A⊥)
∫
X
χA⊥dqA (17)
= p(B ∩ A)
p(A)
qA(A) + p(B ∩ A
⊥)
p(A⊥)
qA(A⊥) (18)
= p(B ∩ A)
p(A)
rA︸︷︷︸
=1
+ p(B ∩ A
⊥)
p(A⊥)
rA⊥︸︷︷︸
=0
(19)
= p(B ∩ A)
p(A)
(20)
So the Bayesian answer given in terms of the conditional expectation to the general
question of statistical inference covers the case when the probability measure qA
defined on the small Boolean subalgebra A of S takes on arbitrary values—not just
the extremevaluesqA(A) = 1 andqA(A⊥) = 0.Thenotionof conditional expectation
is indispensable to cover this general case of Bayesian statistical inference.
2.3 Conditional expectation: the general case
One can generalize the notion of conditional expectation by replacing the four-element
Boolean algebra A generated by a single element A [see Eq. (4)] by an arbitrary sub-
σ -field A of S:
Definition 3 Let (X,S, p) be a probability space, A be a sub-σ -field of S, and pA
be the restriction of p to A. A map
E (· | A) : L1(X,S, p) → L1(X,A, pA) (21)
is called an A-conditional expectation from L1(X,S, p) to L1(X,A, pA) if (i) and
(ii) below hold:
(i) For all f ∈ L1(X,S, p), the E ( f | A) is A-measurable.
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(ii) E (· | A) preserves the integration on elements of A:
∫
Z
E ( f | A)dpA =
∫
Z
f dp ∀Z ∈ A. (22)
It is not obvious that such a map E (· | A) exists but the Radon–Nikodym theorem
entails that it always does:
Proposition 1 (Billingsley 1995, p. 445; Bogachev 2007 Theorem 10.1.5). Given
any (X,S, p) and any sub-σ -field A of S, a conditional expectation E (· | A) from
L1(X,S, p) to L1(X,A, pA) exists.
Note that uniqueness is not part of the claim in Proposition 1, and for good reason:
the conditional expectation is only unique up to measure zero:
Proposition 2 (Billingsley 1995, Theorem 16.10 and p. 445; Bogachev 2007, p. 339).
If E ′(· | A) is another conditional expectation then for any f ∈ L1(X,S, p) the two
L1-functions E ( f | A) and E ′( f | A) are equal up to a p-probability zero set.
Different conditional expectations equal up to measure zero are called versions of
the conditional expectation. The claims in the next proposition are to be understood
as “up to measure zero”.
Proposition 3 (Billingsley 1995, Sect. 34). A conditional expectation has the follow-
ing properties:
(i) E (· | A) is a linear map.
(ii) E (· | A) is a projection:
E (E ( f | A) | A) = E ( f | A) ∀ f ∈ L1(X,S, p) (23)
Remark 2 IfA is generated by a countably infinite set {Ai }i∈IN of pairwise orthogonal
elements from S such that p(Ai ) = 0 (i = 1, . . .), then the conditional expectation
(21) can be given explicitly on the characteristic functions L1(X,S, p) by a formula
that is the complete analogue of (5):
E (χB | A) =
∑
i
p(B ∩ Ai )
p(Ai )
χAi ∀B ∈ S (24)
However, for a general A the conditional expectation cannot be given explicitly, its
existence is the corollary of the Radon-Nikodym theorem,which is a non-constructive,
pure existence theorem. Note also that if A is generated by a countably infinite set
{Ai }i∈IN of pairwise orthogonal elements from S but p(Ai ) = 0 for some Ai then (24)
still yields the conditional expectationwith themodification that the undefined p(B∩Ai )p(Ai )
is replaced by any number—this is the phenomenon of the conditional expectation
being defined up to a probability zero set (Proposition 2).
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Remark 3 The conditional expectations can be thought of as an averaging or coarse
graining process: if the sub-σ -field A is generated by the disjunct elements Aλ, where
λ ∈  are parameters in an arbitrary index set (not necessarily countable), in which
case Aλ are atoms in the generated σ -field A, then the A-measurability condition on
the A-conditional expectation entails that E( f | A) is a constant function on every
Aλ. This constant value on Aλ is the averaged, course-grained value of f on Aλ. (The
event Aλ might very well not be an atom in S, and so f can vary on elements and
subsets of Aλ.)
2.4 Bayesian statistical inference and conditional expectation: general case
Problem of statistical inference: general formulation:Let (X,S, p) be a probability
space,A be a sub-σ -field of S. Assume thatψA is a || · ||1-continuous linear functional
onL1(X,A, pA) determined by a probability measure qA given onA via integral [cf.
Eq. (1)]. What is the extension ψ of ψA from L1(X,A, pA) to a || · ||1-continuous
linear functional on L1(X,S, p)?
The Bayesian answer:
Definition 4 (Bayesian statistical inference). Let the extension ψ be
ψ( f )
.= ψA(E ( f | A)) ∀ f ∈ L1(X,S, p) (25)
where E (· | A) is the A-conditional expectation from L1(X,S, p) to L1(X,A, pA).
Note that because E (· | A) is a projection operator on L1(X,S, p) (Proposition
3), ψ is indeed an extension of ψA, and because E (· | A) is ‖ · ‖1-continuous, the
extension ψ also is || · ||1-continuous.
The notion of conditional probability of an event obtains as a special case of
Bayesian statistical inference so defined [see Marchand (1977, 1981) and Marchand
(1982) for further discussion of the relation of statistical inference and conditional-
ization]:
Definition 5 If B ∈ S then its (A, ψA)-conditional probability q(B) is the expecta-
tion value of its characteristic function χB computed using the formula (25) containing
the A-conditional expectation:
q(B)
.= ψ(χB) = ψA(E(χB | A)) (26)
Comments on the definition of conditional probability:
1. Note that there is no restriction in this general definition of conditional probability
on the conditioning σ -field A, nor on the values the unconditional (background)
measure p can have on this algebra A; in particular some elements of the con-
ditioning σ -field A can have zero unconditional probability. Thus, in principle,
Definition 5 of conditional probability covers such cases and one can have condi-
tional probabilities with respect to events that have prior probability zero.
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2. If the σ -fieldA is generated by a single element A, and if element A has non-zero
unconditional probability, p(A) = 0, and if the conditional measure is assumed
to take value 1 on A, then the conditional probability measure q is the normalized
restriction of the unconditional measure p to A; i.e. in this special case the con-
ditional probability is given by the Bayes’ rule (see Remark 1). But this special
case is not only extremely special but also slightly deceptive because it conceals
the true content and conceptual structure of conditionalization: that conditional
probabilities depend sensitively on three conditions (variables):
(i) The conditioning σ -field A.
(ii) The probability measure qA defined on A.
(iii) The conditional expectation E(· | A).
3. If the σ -field A is generated by a countably infinite number of mutually
orthogonal elements each having non-zero p-probability, then the correspond-
ing A-conditional expectation is of the form given by Eq. (2). In this case the
(A, ψA)-conditional probability measure q specified by Definition 5 is identical
to the one obtained by using the method of “Jeffrey conditionalization” (Jeffrey
1965). Thus Jeffrey conditionalization is a special case of conditionalization via
conditional expectation—although this connection does not seem to bewell known
[Gyenis and Rédei (2016) makes this connection more explicit].
4. Putting Z = X in the defining property (ii) of the conditional expectation (Eq. (22))
and remembering that pA is the restriction of p to A, we obtain:
∫
X
E (χB | A)dp =
∫
X
χBdp = p(B) (27)
This requirement should be familiar: Eq. (27) is the “theorem of total probability”.
This becomes more transparent if one sees how it holds when A is a σ -field
generated by a countable partition Ai (i = 1, 2, . . .) such that p(Ai ) = 0 for
every i . In this case we have (cf. Remark 2)
E (χB | A) =
∑
i
p(B ∩ Ai )
p(Ai )
χAi (28)
So we can calculate
∫
X
E (χB | A)dp =
∫
X
∑
i
p(B ∩ Ai )
p(Ai )
χAi dp (29)
=
∑
i
p(B ∩ Ai )
p(Ai )
∫
X
χAi dp (30)
=
∑
i
p(B ∩ Ai )
p(Ai )
p(Ai ) (31)
=
∑
i
p(B ∩ Ai ) (32)
= p(B) (33)
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Remark 4 The assumption of continuity of the linear functional ψA in the definition
of Bayesan statistical inference and in the related definition of conditional probability
(Definitions 4 and 5) entails that qA is absolutely continuous with respect to the
background measure p. Without the absolute continuity of qA the linear functional
ψA ◦ E (· | A) on L1(X,S, p) is not an extension of ψA in general: If A is such
that p(A) = 0 and 0 < q(A) < 1 then E (· | A) can happen to be a version of the
conditional expectation such that E (χA | A) = 1q(A)χA, which entails
q(A) = ψA(E (χA | A)) = 1q(A)q(A) = 1 = q(A) (34)
But even if q is not absolutely continuous with respect to p, the compositionψA◦E (· |
A) can still be an extension of ψA under some special circumstances. For instance if
p(A) = 0 and qA(A) = 1, and E (· | A) is a version such that E (χA | A) = χA, then
ψA ◦ E (· | A) is an extension ψA. In this case the conditional probability q depends
also on the particular version of the conditional expectation used to extend qA. This
situation occurs in the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox situations as we will see in Sects. 3
and 4.
3 Conditional probabilities on probability zero events on the unit square
calculated using conditional expectations
In this section we illustrate the notion of conditional expectation and conditional
probabilities with respect to probability zero events defined in terms of conditional
expectation by describing a simple example that is regarded in probability theory as
paradigmatic.
Let (X, S, p) be the probability space with X = [0, 1] × [0, 1] the unit square in
two dimension, S the Lebesgue measurable sets of [0, 1] × [0, 1] and p the Lebesgue
measure on S. Let C
.= [0, 1] × {z} be any horizontal slice of the square at number
z ∈ [0, 1] and B .= b × {z} be a Lebesgue measurable set of the square with b a
measurable set in the slice (see the Fig. 1). What is the conditional probability of B
on condition C? This question is the perfect analogue of the question asked in the
Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox: the square replaces the sphere, C corresponds to a great
circle and B to the arc on the circle. Furthermore, one may have the intuition that the
answer to the question is determined: the conditional probability of B on condition
C should be equal to the length l(b) (one-dimensional Lebesgue measure) of b. But
the “ratio analysis” (Bayes’ rule) does not provide this answer because C has measure
zero in the Lebesgue measure on the square. We have the square version of the Borel–
Kolmogorov situation if we assume that the probability space on the square represents
choosing a point randomly on the square.
Application of conditionalization via conditional expectation to this situation is the
following. Consider the σ -field A ⊂ S generated by the sets of form [0, 1] × A with
A a Lebesgue measurable subset of [0, 1]. Note that A contains the slices [0, 1] × {z}
where z is a number in [0, 1]; these sets have measure zero in the Lebesgue measure
on the square. Then the A-conditional expectation
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Fig. 1 The Borel–Kolmogorov
Paradox situation on the unit
square
z
b
E (· | A) : L1([0, 1] × [0, 1],S, p) → L1([0, 1] × [0, 1],A, pA) (35)
exists, and an elementary calculation shows that the defining conditions (i) and (ii) in
Definition 3 hold for the E (· | A) given explicitly by:
E ( f | A)(x, y) =
∫ 1
0
f (x, y)dx ∀(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] (36)
Inserting the characteristic function χB of B = b × {z} in the place of f in Eq. (36)
one obtains for all (x, y) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]:
E (χB | A)(x, y) =
∫ 1
0
χb×{z}(x, y)dx (37)
=
{
l(b), if y = z
0, if y = z (38)
If qA is the probability measure on the σ -field A such that
qA(C) = qA([0, 1] × {z}) = 1 (39)
qA(C⊥) = qA(([0, 1] × {z})⊥) = 0 (40)
then, by the definition of Bayesian statistical inference (see also Remark 4), the
(A, qA)-conditional probability q(b × {z})) of B on condition C = [0, 1] × {z},
i.e. on condition that qA([0, 1] × {z}) = 1, can be calculated using (37):
q(b × {z}) = qA(E (χb×{z} | A)) (41)
=
∫
[0,1]×[0,1]
E (χb×{z} | A)dqA (42)
= l(b) (43)
This is in complete agreement with intuition: Given any one dimensional slice C =
[0, 1] × {z} at point z across the square, the (A, qA)-conditional probability of the
subset b of that slice on condition that we are on that slice (qA(C) = 1) is proportional
to the length of the subset b. This result is obtained using the technique of conditional
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expectation with respect to a sub-σ -field A some elements of which have probability
zero. This is regarded as a classic example of conditioning with respect to probability
zero events (Billingsley 1995, p. 432).
The phenomenon of the conditional expectation being determined only up to a
probability zero set also can be illustrated on this example. We know that conditional
expectations are defined up tomeasure zero only (Proposition 2). Thus, the conditional
expectation E(· | A) defined by (36) is just one version of the conditional expectation
determined by the σ -field A. Another version Em(· | A) of the A-conditional expec-
tation can be obtained by choosing a particular z0 ∈ [0, 1] and defining Em(· | A)
by
Em( f | A)(x, y) .=
{
E ( f | A)(x, y), if y = z0∫ 1
0 ρ(x) f (x, y)dx, if y = z0
(44)
where ρ is a probability density function for a probability measure m on [0, 1] (with
respect to the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]). Computing the conditional probability
q(b×{z0}) along the lines of (41)–(43) using theEm(· | A)versionof theA-conditional
expectation one obtains
q(b × {z0}) = ψA(Em(χb×{z0} | A)) (45)
=
∫
[0,1]×[0,1]
Em(χb×{z0} | A)dqA (46)
=
∫
b
ρ(x)dx (47)
= m(b) (48)
Thus, givenA and any, fixed, one dimensional slice of the square, one obtains different
values for the conditional probability of Lebesgue measurable subsets of that slice
depending on which version of the A-conditional expectation one uses to calculate it.
Using the “canonical” version given by (36) one obtains the value proportional to the
length, using the m-version Eq(· | A) given by (44) one obtains the value m(b). Fixing
the σ -field alone does not determine any of these two versions, or indeed any of an
uncountable number of other versions, in harmony with the conditional expectation
being undetermined up to a measure zero set. But then what singles out the canonical
version?
Having a look at the definition of E (· | A) [Eq. (44)], one realizes that it is the par-
ticular mathematical structure of the situation that makes that definition possible and
thus singles out the canonical version: the set of elementary events of the probability
space on the unit square has the form of product [0, 1] × [0, 1], and one can perform
a partial integral with respect to one variable in the product probability space. These
two conditions together with the specific form and location of the conditioning σ -field
in the product structure determine not only a conditional expectation that yields the
“proportional-to-the-length” value l(b) on all slices except for sets of slices that have
measure zero in the two dimensional Lebesgue measure but a version that yields the
“intuitively right” conditional probabilities on every slice.
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The crucial role of the product structure in the existence of the canonical version of
the conditional expectation can also be seen if one realizes that the reasoning involving
Eqs. (35)–(43) remain valid without any change if one replaces (i) the unit square with
the Lebesgue measure on it by any product space (X1× X2,S1⊗S2, p1× p2), and (ii)
the σ -fieldA by a σ -field generated by elements of the form X1× B (B ∈ S2). Hence,
even if the component probability spaces (X1,S1, p1) and (X2,S2, p2) in the product
have finite Boolean algebras (and consequently so does the product space), and even
if some events in the component algebras have probability zero, the analogue of the
canonical conditional expectation (35) exists and yields probabilities conditional on
probability zero events via the analogue of Eq. (43), although it is very clear that
conditional expectations are genuinely undetermined on probability zero events in
finite probability spaces in general. To see this finite situation explicitly, consider the
following simple example:
Let (X1,S1, p1) be generated by two atomic events B1 and B2 and (X2,S2, p2)
be generated by two atomic events C1 and C2 with probabilities
p1(B1) = 1
2
p1(B2) = 1
2
(49)
p2(C1) = 0 p2(C2) = 1 (50)
Then the product space
(X1 × X2,S1 ⊗ S2, p1 × p2) (51)
is generated by the four atomic events
A1 = B1 × C1; A2 = B2 × C1; A3 = B1 × C2; A4 = B2 × C2 (52)
(p1 × p2 is the product measure). Let C be the Boolean algebra generated by elements
of the form X1 × C (C ∈ S2) and pC be the restriction of p1 × p2 to C. Then there
exists a conditional expectation
E (· | C) : L1(X1 × X2,S1 ⊗ S2, p1 × p2) → L1(X1 × X2, C, pC) (53)
given by
E ( f | C)(xi , y j ) = 1
2
∑
i
f (xi , y j ) xi = Bi , y j = C j (i, j = 1, 2) (54)
whichwe call the canonical conditional expectation. Using the delta function notation
δi, j =
{
1, if i = j
0, if i = j (55)
the values of the characteristic function χB1×C1 can be written as
χB1×C1(xi , y j ) = δ1iδ1 j xi = Bi , y j = C j (i, j = 1, 2) (56)
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and so the value of the canonical conditional expectation on the characteristic function
χB1×C1 can be computed explicitly:
E (χB1×C1 | C)(xi , y j ) =
1
2
δ1 j xi = Bi , y j = C j (i, j = 1, 2) (57)
If qC is the probability measure on C such that
qC(X1 × C1) = 1 (58)
qC(X1 × C2) = 0 (59)
then the canonical conditional expectation (54) yields a definite conditional probability
q(B1 × C1) on condition X1 × C1, which is a measure zero event in the probability
space (X1 × X2,S1 ⊗ S2, p1 × p2):
q(B1 × C1) = qC(E (χB1×C1 | C)) = (60)
=
∫
X1×X2
E (χB1×C1 | C)dqC (61)
=
∑
j
1
2
δ1 j qC(X1 × C j ) = 12qC(X1 × C1) =
1
2
(62)
Thus, using the technique of conditional expectation in a probability space with a finite
Boolean algebra, we have obtained a definite value for the conditional probability of an
event with respect to a conditioning event that has probability zero. On the other hand,
we know that in finite Boolean algebras conditional expectations are always of the
form (24) (cf. Remark 2), and that form clearly shows that the value of the conditional
expectation is not determined on probability zero events in general; hence conditional
probabilities with respect to probability zero events are also left undetermined. There
is of course no contradiction here. The point is that the product structure singles out a
particular version of the conditional expectation with respect to a particular Boolean
subalgebra that is located in a specific position with respect to the product so that
a version of the conditional expectation can be obtained by taking a partial integral.
This version in turn yields a specific value for conditional probabilities with respect
to probability zero events. It is important to emphasize that the product structure just
singles out the canonical version but does not entail it logically because any version
is compatible with the product structure.
4 “Intuitively correct” conditional probabilities with respect to
probability zero events in the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox obtained
using conditional expectations
Consider now the probability space (S,B(S), p) on the unit sphere S in three dimen-
sion with the surface measure p on the Lebesgue sets B(S) on S. Choose a great circle
C on S. We wish to calculate the conditional probability of an arc B on condition that
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Fig. 2 Polar coordinates
x
y
z
r
θ
ϕ
the arc is on the great circleC . One can calculate this conditional probability following
exactly the steps used to calculate the conditional probability of the subset b of a slice
of the square on condition that b is on that slice. The only difference is in the slight
complication due to the non-trivial geometry of the sphere.
Points of the unit sphere S can be given by polar coordinates:
S = {(x(φ, θ, r), y(φ, θ, r), z(φ, θ, r)) : 0 ≤ φ ≤ 2π, 0 ≤ θ ≤ π, r = 1} (63)
where
x(φ, θ, r) = r cosφ sin θ (64)
y(φ, θ, r) = r sin φ sin θ (65)
z(φ, θ, r) = r cos θ (66)
(See Fig. 2)
In our case r = 1 is fixed whence each mapping f (x, y, z) : S → R can be
identified with a two-variable function
f (φ, θ) = f (x(φ, θ, 1), y(φ, θ, 1), z(φ, θ, 1)) : [0, 2π ] × [0, π ] → R (67)
and the sphere S and the chosen great circle C can be identified with the sets
S = {(φ, θ) : φ ∈ [0, 2π ], θ ∈ [0, π ]} = [0, 2π ] × [0, π ] (68)
C = {(φ, π/2) : φ ∈ [0, 2π ]} = [0, 2π ] × {π/2} (69)
Let O be the σ -field generated by measurable sets of circles on the sphere plane of
which is parallel to that of the chosen great circle C (see Fig. 3):
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Fig. 3 Parallel circles
generating σ -algebra O
c
C
x
y
z
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O = {[0, 2π ] × A : A ⊆ [0, π ] is measurable} (70)
There exist then the O-conditional expectation
E(· | O) : L1(S,B(S), p) → L1(S,O, pO) (71)
and one can verify (see Appendix 1 in the Appendix section for details) that E(· | O)
given by
E( f | O)(φ, θ) = 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
f (φ, θ) dφ (72)
is a version of the O-conditional expectation.
Let χB be the characteristic function of an arc B on the great circle C specified by
the angles φ1 and φ2:
B = [φ1, φ2] × {π/2} (73)
Then we have
E(χB | O)(φ, θ) = 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
χB(φ, θ) dφ = 1
2π
∫ φ2
φ1
1 dφ (74)
= 1
2π
{
φ2 − φ1 if θ = π2
0 otherwise.
(75)
If qO is the probability measure on the sphere taking value 1 on the great circle C
and value 0 on its complement C⊥ (see also Remark 4), then the (O, qO)-conditional
probability q(B) of the arc B can be computed easily using (75)
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q(B) = ψO(χB) =
∫
S
E(χB |O)dqO (76)
= φ2 − φ1
2π
(77)
That is to say, the (O, qO)-conditional probability q(B) of the arc B is proportional
to the length of the arc. Thus, just like in case of the square, choosing a suitable
sub-σ -field of the Lebesgue sets of the sphere, and using the device of conditional
expectations defined by the chosen sub-σ -field, one can obtain the sought after condi-
tional probabilities with respect to probability zero events in the Borel–Kolmogorov
situation, and the calculated conditional probabilities are the “intuitively correct” ones.
What is the problem then?
5 Conditional probability with respect to probability zero events in the
Borel–Kolmogorov situation depends on the conditioning algebra
The alleged problem is that the conditional probabilities so obtained depend on the
σ -field O: if, instead of O, one takes the σ -field M generated by (measurable sets of)
great circles that intersect C at the same two points (“meridian circles” with respect to
North and South Poles), then the (M, qM)-conditional probability of the arc B will be
different from the (O, qO)-conditional probability of the arc B:One can calculate these
(M, qM)-conditional probabilities of B following exactly the steps in the preceding
Sect. 4 which led to the (O, qO)-conditional probabilities: Choose a meridian circle
C that in the introduced polar coordinates is given by
C = {(0, θ), (π, θ) : θ ∈ [0, π ]} = {0, π} × [0, π ] (78)
That is to say:C is themeridian circle at longitude 0 (see Fig. 4). Call a set A ⊆ [0, 2π ]
symmetric if x ∈ A implies that (x +π)modulo 2π also belongs to A. Note that {0, π}
in (78) is symmetric, and each collection ofmeridian circles correspond to a set of form
A × [0, π ], where A is symmetric. (Remark: one could get rid of requiring symmetry
by letting the parameter θ run from 0 to 2π ). Let M be the σ -field generated by all
measurable sets of meridian circles:
M = {A × [0, π ] : A ⊆ [0, 2π ] is measurable and symmetric} (79)
There exist then the M-conditional expectation
E(· | M) : L1(S,B(S), p) → L1(S,M, pM) (80)
One can verify (for details see Appendix 2 in the Appendix section) that a version of
E(· | M) is given by
E( f | M)(φ, θ) = 1
2
∫ 2π
0
f (φ, θ)| sin θ | dθ (81)
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Fig. 4 Meridian circles
generating σ -field M
North Pole
South Pole
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Let χB be the characteristic function of an arc on the meridian circle C specified by
the angles 0 ≤ θ1 < θ2 ≤ π :
B = {0} × [θ1, θ2] (82)
Then we have
E(χB | M)(φ, θ) = 1
2
∫ 2π
0
χB(φ, θ)| sin θ | dθ (83)
= 1
2
{∫ θ2
θ1
sin θ dθ = cos θ1 − cos θ2 if φ = 0
0 otherwise
(84)
If qM is the probability measure on the σ -field M taking value 1 on the meridian
circle C and value 0 on its complement C⊥ (see also Remark 4), then the (M, qM)-
conditional probability q(B) of the arc B can be calculated easily by using (83):
q(B) = ψM(χB) =
∫
S
E(χB | M) dqM (85)
= cos θ1 − cos θ2
2
(86)
Clearly, the (M, qM)-conditional (86) and (O, qO)-conditional (77) probabilities are
different.
Note that, just like in case of the square, both the O-conditional and the M-
conditional expectation are only determined only up to probability zero events, and the
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definitions (72) and (81) yield specific versions of the respective conditional expecta-
tions. These versions are singled out, again, by the fact that the sphere and the circles
on it have a Cartesian product structure and the conditioning σ -fields are located in
a specific position with respect to the product so that a version of the conditional
expectation can be obtained by taking a partial integral.
Remark 5 The O-conditional expectation (72) can be used to calculate the O-
conditional probability on any circle c parallel to the great circle C specified by (69):
the calculation following the steps (73)–(77) results in a uniform distribution on any
such circle c. Similarly: the M-conditional expectation (81) can be used to calculate
the M-conditional probability on any meridian circle CM replacing the great circle
C specified by (78). Repeating the steps (82)–(86) one obtains the M-conditional
distribution (86) on CM .
Given a great circle C one could of course consider the four element σ -field A
containing C , its complement, the empty set and the whole sphere, and compute
the (A, qA)-conditional probability of an arc on C , using the A-conditional expec-
tation. Since this A is generated by a countable set of disjoint elements, we know
(Remark 2) what form the A-conditional expectation has in this case, and we also
know that since C has measure zero in the surface measure of the sphere, the value
of the A-conditional expectation on C is left undetermined. Thus we can take any
value we regard as “intuitively correct”, and choose the corresponding version of
the A-conditional expectation. Thus conditionalizing using the theory of conditional
expectations can accommodate any value of conditional probability on a probability
zero event, including the “intuitively correct” uniform conditional probability. But
this conditional probability is not determined in the theory of conditionalization by
choosing the conditioning algebra to be A and by the stipulation that the probability
on the sphere is given by the uniform measure. We will explain in Sect. 7 why one
may have the wrong intuition that it is.
6 Is dependence of conditional probability on the conditioning algebra
paradoxical?
One finds in the literature two types of worries concerning the (M, qM)-conditional
and (O, qO)-conditional probabilities. One is what we call, using Howson’s termi-
nology (Howson 2014, p. 8), the Description-Relativity Worry, the other is that the
(M, qM)-conditional probability is counterintuitive. These twoworries form the heart
of the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox. In this section we will show that the Description-
Relativity Worry rests on a misinterpretation of what the difference between the
(M, qM)-conditional and (O, qO)-conditional probabilities signify, and in Sect. 7
we will argue that the (M, qM)-conditional probabilities are not counterintuitive.
The Description-Relativity Worry is the concern that when it comes to calculate
any probability, conditional probabilities included, it should not matter how the ran-
dom events involved are described: what specific parameters are used to refer to
random events and what coordinate system is used to fix a particular notation in
which probabilistic calculations are carried out should be a matter of convention, not
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affecting the values of probabilities. Inwhat followswe use the general term “labeling”
to refer to any description, parametrization, coordinatization etc. of random events.
The Description-Relativity Worry is then that the (M, qM)-conditional and (O, qO)-
conditional probabilities violate what one can call “Labeling Irrelevance”: the norm
that values of probabilities should not depend on labeling. This is a very important
principle, which is crucial in probabilistic modeling: its violation is not compatible
with an objective interpretation of probability (this is argued in detail in Gyenis and
Rédei (2015a), where it is shown that Bertrand’s Paradox does not entail violation of
Labeling Irrelevance). Subjective interpretations of probability are a different matter:
a subject’s degrees of beliefs might depend on particular labeling of random events,
as Rescorla argues Rescorla (2014) [see also Easwaran (2008)]. We do not wish to
discuss this situation, see the end of Sect. 7 for some brief comments. In any case, it
is obviously important to know whether the Description-Relativity Worry is indeed
justified in connection with the difference of the (M, qM)-conditional and (O, qO)-
conditional probabilities. We claim it is not.
Rescorla derives the conditional probabilities (77) and (86) using the technique of
calculating conditional probability density functions (pdf’s) rather than specifying the
two σ -fields O and M explicitly and calculating the respective conditional expecta-
tions. Having done this, Rescorla expresses the Description-Relativity Worry thus:
. . . conditional probability density is not invariant under coordinate transfor-
mation. Standard techniques for computing conditional pdfs yield different
solutions, depending upon our choice of coordinates. Apparently, then, the
coordinate system through which I describe a null event impacts how I should
condition on the null event. This dependence upon a coordinate system looks
paradoxical. Since the null event remains the same, shouldn’t I obtain the same
answer either way? (Rescorla 2014, p. 10)
Viewing the difference between the (M, qM)-conditional (86) and (O, qO)-
conditional (77) probabilities as violation of Labeling Irrelevance is however a
misinterpretation of the phenomenon. This becomes transparent when one specifies
more carefully what “coordinate transformation”, “different descriptions” or “re-
labeling” of random events are.
Assume that (X,S, p) and (X ′,S ′, p′) are probability spaces. Then (X ′,S ′) can
be viewed as a re-labeled copy of (X,S) if there exists a bijection f between X and X ′
such that both f and its inverse f −1 aremeasurable: the inverse image under f of every
A′ ∈ S ′ is in S, and the inverse image under the inverse function f −1 of every A ∈ S
is in S ′. The function f is then called a re-labeling. Note that without the double-
measurability condition the function f cannot be considered a re-labeling because if
the inverse function f −1 were not measurable, then some elements in S would be
“lost” when passing via f from (X,S) to (X ′,S ′): there would then exist an A ∈ S
such that f [A] = { f (x) : x ∈ A} /∈ S ′. Similarly: if f were notmeasurable, then there
would be an element A′ ∈ S ′ that refers to some general random event that is part of
the phenomenon (X ′,S ′, p′) is a model of, but f −1[A′] = { f −1(x ′) : x ′ ∈ A′} /∈ S,
hence under the re-labeling f that random event would be lost in the model (X,S, p).
In this case the two probability spaces (X,S, p) and (X ′,S ′, p′) obviously could not
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be regarded as models of the same random phenomenon with the only difference that
random events are differently labeled in them. Because of the double measurability
condition on re-labeling f , a re-labeling gives rise to an isomorphism h f between the
σ -fields S and S ′ (h f is the inverse image function of the inverse function f −1 of f ).
Recall that if f is a re-labeling between X and X ′, and f and f −1 also preserve p
and p′, respectively, in the sense that (87)–(88) below hold
p′( f [A]) = p(A) for all A ∈ S (87)
p( f −1[A′]) = p′(A′) for all A′ ∈ S ′ (88)
then the probability spaces (X,S, p) and (X ′,S ′, p′) are called isomorphic as prob-
ability spaces and f is a (measure theoretic) isomorphism (Aaronson 1997, p. 3). It
is obvious that a re-labeling need not be a measure theoretic isomorphism in general.
Less obvious is that a re-labeling is not necessarily a measure theoretic isomorphism
even if the probability measures are very special; possibly so special that one expects
re-labelings to be isomorphisms: this happens when p and p′ are both Haar measures.
This lies at the heart of Bertrand’s Paradox, seeGyenis andRédei (2015a, b) for details.
Labeling Irrelevance can now be expressed by the claim that when describing a
phenomenon probabilistically, we can choose either the (X,S) or the (X ′,S ′) labeling
of random events as long as there is a re-labeling f between X and X ′. Indeed: nothing
can prevent us choosing either from elements of (X,S) or from elements of (X ′,S ′)
when we wish to refer to random events, and if we choose (X,S), then we can specify
a probability measure p on S such that the probability space (X,S, p) is a goodmodel
of the phenomenon. Choosing the probability p′[A′] .= p( f −1[A′]) on (X ′,S ′)makes
(X ′,S ′, p′) also a good model of the phenomenon and (X,S, p) and (X ′,S ′, p′) will
be isomorphic as probability spaceswith respect to f . In short Labeling Irrelevance, the
conventionality of labeling of random events in probabilistic modeling, is expressed
by the claim that measure theoretically isomorphic probability spaces can be used to
describe the same random phenomenon.
An example of re-labeling is passing from the Cartesian coordinates to the polar
coordinates when describing the sphere and its measurable subsets: the transformation
(64)–(66) is a double measurable bijection. Any point and any measurable subset
on the sphere can be expressed either in the (x, y, z) coordinates or in the (φ, θ, r)
coordinates.
It should now be clear that the difference between the (M, qM)-conditional (86)
and (O, qO)-conditional (77) probabilities is not a case of violation of Labeling
Irrelevance: the two conditional probabilities cannot be considered as conditional
probabilities of the same event with respect to the same conditioning conditions in
different “co-ordinatizations” (labelings): When one calculates the conditional proba-
bilities of an event A ∈ S in a different, “primed” labeling (inS ′), then the conditioning
conditions also have to be considered in the primed labeling, otherwise the condition-
ing is not with respect to the same conditions. Thus if A is a sub-σ -field of S and
one computes the A-conditional expectation in (X,S, p) and the corresponding A-
conditional probabilities of A, then to obtain the conditional probabilities of the same
event in the primed labeling with respect to the same conditioning conditions, calcu-
lated in (X ′,S ′, p′), one has to use the h f (A)-conditional expectation in (X ′,S ′, p′)
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to calculate the conditional probabilities of h f (A). Here h f is the Boolean algebra iso-
morphism between S and S ′ determined by the re-labeling f . The restriction of h f to
A is a Boolean algebra isomorphism between A and h f (A) and so the A-conditional
probability of A and the A′-conditional probability of A′ can be regarded as the con-
ditional probability of the same event in different labeling with respect to the same
conditions in different labeling only if there exists a Boolean algebra isomorphism h
between A and A′ such that h(A) = A′.
There exists however no Boolean algebra isomorphism h between the σ -field O
generated by the measurable sets of circles parallel to a great circle C and the σ -field
M generated by the measurable sets of meridian circles such that h(C) is a great
(meridian) circle in M. This can be seen by a simple indirect proof: Assume the
contrary, i.e. that h is an O → M Boolean algebra isomorphism, C is the great circle
in O, and h(C) is a great circle in M. The circles c in O parallel to the great circle
C are the atoms of O and these are the only atoms in O. The atomic structure of a
σ -field is preserved under isomorphism, so h(c) are the (only) atoms in M. Since the
two element set {North Pole, South Pole} is an atom in M, there is a c0 ∈ O such that
h(c0) = {North Pole, South Pole}; furthermore c0 = C because h(C) is assumed to
be a great circle. We have C ∩ c = ∅ for any circle c ∈ O parallel to C and different
from C , in particular C ∩ c0 = ∅, which entails (h being an isomorphism)
∅ = h(C ∩ c0) (89)
= h(C) ∩ h(c0) = h(C) ∩ {North Pole, South Pole} (90)
= {North Pole, South Pole} (91)
(the last equation holding because h(C) was assumed to be a great circle in M, and
all meridian circles contain both the South and the North Poles). Since (89)–(91) is a
contradiction, no such isomorphism exists.
In fact, more is true: there exists no isomorphism between the subalgebras O and
M at all. To see this, let s = (φ0, θ0) be a point on the sphere such that (θ0 = 0, π).
We claim that the following are true:
(i) If s ∈ A ∈ O, then the whole circle {(φ, θ0) : φ ∈ [0, 2π ]} parallel to the equator
must be a subset of A.
(ii) If s ∈ B ∈ M, then the meridian circle {(φ0, θ) : θ ∈ [0, π ]} has to be a subset
of B.
(i) and (ii) can be proved by induction: the statements obviously hold for the generator
elements of the algebras O and M, and it is not hard to see that (i) and (ii) remain true
under taking arbitrary unions, meets and complement. (ii) entails that the intersection
of two non-disjoint elements A, B ∈ Mmust contain the set {North Pole, South Pole}
(which belongs to M). In other words, there is an element C = ∅ in M (namely
C = {North Pole, South Pole}) such that for any two sets A, B ∈ M, if A ∩ B = ∅,
thenC ⊆ A∩B. The same does not hold inO: Let A = {cθ1 , cθ2} and B = {cθ1 , cθ3} be
two sets of parallel circles with latitudes θ1, θ2 and θ3. Then A∩ B = {cθ1}. Taking two
similar sets A′ and B ′ of parallel circles one has A′ ∩ B ′ = {cθ ′1} and clearly cθ1 = cθ ′1
need not hold, and this prevents the existence of an Boolean algebra isomorphism
between O and M.
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Thus indeed “It can’t be the case that, conditional on the chosen point lying on the
circle that is the great circle containing the Greenwich meridian of our first coordina-
tization and is the equator of our second, we have different conditional distributions
depending on how we describe the circle.” (Myrvold 2014, p. 14) But there is no dan-
ger of such a counterintuitive dependence to occur in the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox
situation. This is because considering the great circle first as the “Greenwich merid-
ian” in the σ -field M generated by meridian circles, and, second, as the “equator”
element in the σ -fieldO are not “different descriptions” of the same great circle in two
coordinatizations: Given a coordinatization (e.g. in terms of the polar coordinates),
one can describe the circle uniquely as a particular set of ordered pairs of real numbers
[see (69)]. Given Cartesian coordinates, one also can describe the same great circle
as ordered pairs of different real numbers. These sets of pairs of numbers are differ-
ent descriptions of the same great circle. When one considers the same great circle
as an element in the σ -fields O and M, respectively, and calculates the conditional
probability distribution on the great circle using (particular versions of the)O- andM-
conditional expectations, then one does not “re-coordinatize” or “re-describe” the great
circle but calculates conditional probabilities with respect to different conditioning
σ -fields. Each of these two conditional probabilities are invariant with respect to coor-
dinatization (description) when re-coordinatization and re-description are properly
understood as re-labelings that are measure theoretic isomorphisms. That these con-
ditional probabilities are different is perfectly understandable and acceptable because
they do not indicate a paradoxical dependence of conditional probabilities of the same
event with respect to the same conditioning conditions in different co-ordinatization
but a sensitive dependence of conditional probabilities of the same event on differ-
ent conditioning σ -fields with respect to which conditional probabilities are defined in
terms of conditional expectations. This latter dependence is however not only not para-
doxical but entirely natural and expected once the concept of conditional probability
is defined properly in terms of conditional expectations.
7 Why one may think that only the uniform conditional probability on a
great circle in the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox is correct
The conclusion of the previous section already indicates what we would like to for-
mulate here explicitly: Both the (O, qO)-conditional and the (M, qM)-conditional
distributions on the great circle are intuitively correct—when one has the correct
concept of conditionalization in mind. To see this and to understand why one might
have the intuition that only the uniform probability on any great circle is the intu-
itively correct conditional probability, one has to draw a clear distinction between
(i) probability theory taken in itself as part of pure mathematics and (ii) probability
theory as mathematical model of some phenomena (application of probability the-
ory). The importance of these distinctions were emphasized in Gyenis and Rédei
(2015a), where conceptual confusions resulting from disregarding them is ana-
lyzed from the perspective of another alleged paradox involving probability theory
(Bertrand’s Paradox).
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7.1 Probability theory as pure mathematics
Probability theory taken in itself and defined by the Kolmogorovian axioms is part
of pure mathematics, a branch of measure theory. A mathematical statement, claim,
inference, is therefore probabilistic only if it can be stated in terms of measure theo-
retical concepts, i.e. in terms of σ -fields and σ -additive measures on σ -fields, and not
probabilistic if more is needed to formulate them.
Consider now the Borel-Paradox situation in itself, as part of pure mathematics.
Then the question is why one may think that the uniform length measure on a great
circle is determined probabilistically by the surface measure on the sphere. One rea-
son, we claim, is that when one thinks about the relation of the length measure and
the surface measure, one might not distinguish carefully between the length measure
being determined probabilistically (via conditionalization) and being determined by
some mathematical condition. By the length measure “being determined probabilisti-
cally” we mean it being deducible from the surface measure referring only to measure
theoretic concepts. Thus we may think correctly that the uniform distribution on the
meridian and the surface measure are related in a very tight, natural way, but we might
not realize that the link is not probabilistic.
This happens for instance when one “feels intuitively” that the rotational symmetry
of the Borel–Kolmogorov situation singles out the uniform probability on a great circle
as the only one that “matches” the uniform measure on the sphere (Myrvold 2014,
Sect. 3.2). This feeling is justified in the sense that it can be translated into precise
mathematical terms: The uniformmeasure on a great circle is singled out indeed as the
(unique) measure that is invariant with respect to the natural “subgroup” of rotations
(in the plane of the circle) of the full group of rotations in the three dimensional space,
with respect to which the surface measure is invariant.1 The important point to realize
however is that this link between the surface measure and the measure on the circle is
non-probabilistic, it cannot be stated in measure theoretic terms only: one needs the
theory of (topological) groups to obtain the length measure this way. Thinking that the
uniform length measure on a great circle is determined probabilistically by the surface
measure on the sphere is therefore a fallacious intuition.
This fallacy can be made more explicit: Since probability theory is specified in the
Kolmogorovian axiomatization as a probabilitymeasure space, a concept is probabilis-
tic only if it is invariant with respect to isomorphisms of probability measure spaces.
A probability measure space (X,S, p) is called a standard probability space if X is
a complete, separable metric space and S is the completion of the Borel σ -algebra of
X . Standard, non-atomic probability spaces are isomorphic to the unit interval with
the Lebesgue measure on it (Aaronson 1997, Chap. 1, p. 3). Since the sphere with its
uniform surface measure is a standard, measure theoretically non-atomic probability
space, it is isomorphic as a probability measure space to the unit interval with the
Lebesgue measure on it. Under this isomorphism the problem of what the conditional
probability distribution on the great circle is, gets translated faithfully (i.e. without any
loss or distortion of its probabilistic content), into a problemabout the conditional prob-
1 There are somemathematical subtleties involved in how this can be done; see Appendix 3 in the Appendix
section.
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ability distribution on a probability zero set in the unit interval. Since in this probabilis-
tically fully equivalent translation of the problemwemight not have available any sym-
metry that we could rely on to specify ameasure on that probability zero set, it becomes
clear that the rotational symmetry of the conditional probability on the great circle is
not a feature of the conditional probability that can be regarded as determined proba-
bilistically by the assumption that the distribution on the sphere is the uniform one.
Another tight link can be established between the uniform measure on the sphere
and the uniform length measure on a great circle if we think of the sphere, of the
great circle and of their relation not group theoretically but geometrically: regarding
a great circle as a closed one-dimensional differentiable submanifold of the sphere
viewed as a two dimensional differentiable manifold embedded in three dimension,
the uniform measure on both the great circle and the sphere can be obtained from the
Lebesgue measure in three dimension in a canonical manner via standard techniques
in differential geometry (Morvan 2008, Sects. 3.1, 5.3–5.4]. Again, this link between
the uniform measures on the sphere and on a great circle is very natural but cannot
be regarded as probabilistic because concepts of differential geometry are crucial and
indispensable in it and these concepts are not purely measure theoretic.
Distinguishing between probabilistic and non-probabilistic in terms of measure
theoretic isomorphism invariance helps to clarify further the status of the particular ver-
sions of the respective conditional expectations that yield the uniform and non-uniform
probability distributions on a single great circle: A measure theoretic isomorphism
between probability spaces sets up a one-to-ne correspondence between versions of
conditional expectations in the two probability spaces that are determined by σ -fields
that are isomorphic under the measure theoretic isomorphism. The conditional prob-
abilities of events given by versions that are related in this way are the same—this is
in harmony with defusing the Description Relativity Worry. But the product structure
of the probability measure space formed by the sphere with its surface measure is
not invariant with respect to measure theoretic isomorphisms. Hence “singling out”
the particular versions that yield the conditional probabilities on a single great circle
depends on the specific, not purely measure theoretic properties of the sphere with its
surfacemeasure, and the versions are therefore not determined purely probabilistically
by the prior uniform probability on the sphere and the conditioning σ -field.
7.2 Probability theory as mathematical model
Like other mathematical theories, probability theory also can be used to describe
phenomena. In such applications of probability theory, the random events A in S are
related to other entities, and the truth conditions of the statement p(A) = r have to
be specified. In an application, probability theory thus becomes a mathematical model
of a certain phenomenon. The phenomenon itself can be either mathematical or non-
mathematical. A specific probability space is a good model of a phenomenon if the
statements p(A) = r are indeed true (in the sense of the specified condition that is
part of the model).
When one looks at the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox from the perspective of the
concept of application so described, one has to ask what the sphere with the uniform
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distribution on it is a probabilistic model of; i.e. what the phenomenon is that the
probabilistic model describes and how precisely the mathematical theory is related to
the phenomenon in question. There are several conceivable scenarios here. Somewhat
surprisingly, the papers discussing the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox typically do not
specify any.2 This is unfortunate because without knowing what precisely the proba-
bility space is a model of, it is impossible to assess whether certain intuitions about
the probabilistic model are correct or not.
A possible scenario, which is probably closest to how the Borel–Kolmogorov sit-
uation is tacitly interpreted in the literature, is the following. It is assumed that a
specific mathematical algorithm yields points on the surface of the two dimensional
unit sphere in the three dimensional Euclidean space. The uniform probability mea-
sure on the sphere can then be thought of as a model of generating points on the
sphere in the sense of relative frequencies: Running the algorithm N times one can
compute the number r(A, N ) of the generated points falling in a measurable set A
of the sphere, and one can also compute the limit of the ratio r(A,N )N as N → ∞. If
the limit exists and is proportional to the measure of the set A in the surface mea-
sure for any measurable set A, then the sphere with the uniform surface measure is a
good probabilistic model of the point generating algorithm. Note that since generating
points on the two dimensional sphere (more generally: on the N -dimensional sphere)
with uniform distribution is important in Monte Carlo simulations run on computers,
the problem of which algorithms produce such points has been studied extensively
and several such algorithms have been found (Muller 1959; Sibuya 1964; Marsaglia
1972; Tashiro 1977; see also Feller 1966, pp. 29–33).
Viewed from the perspective of this application, both the (O, qO)-conditional and
the (M, qM)-conditional distributions on great circles are intuitively correct: Given
the concept of conditional probability defined by conditional expectation (Sect. 2.4),
the full claim about the (O, qO)-conditional probabilities is: Given the σ -field O,
the (conditional) probability measure on all circles in O (which are all parallel to a
great circle C on the sphere) is the uniform probability on the circles (Remark 5).
Since conditional probabilities are required to satisfy the theorem of total probability
by definition, the major content of this claim is that if we “add up” the conditional
probabilities on these circles, thenwe obtain the uniformmeasure on the surface. Thus,
if we wish to generate points on the surface of the sphere using some mathematical
algorithm, then if the points are generated in such a way that their distribution is
uniformon all circles inO (i.e. uniform in the longitude variableφ) then the distribution
of the generated points will be uniform on the surface of the sphere. This is intuitively
correct: the circles are all parallel, they are all disjoint, their lengths contribute equally
to the surface measure.
The full claim about the (M, qM)-conditional probabilities is: Given the σ -field
M generated by (measurable sets of) all meridian circles (which all share the same
North and South poles), the conditional probability measure on all meridian circles
in M is the probability measure given by the density function cos θ on the meridian
circles, where θ is the latitude variable on every meridian circle (Remark 5). Just as in
2 Rescorla’s paper Rescorla (2014) being an exception, see the end of this section.
123
Synthese
the case of (O, qO)-conditional probabilities, the major content of this claim is that if
we “add up” the conditional probabilities on these meridian circles, then we obtain the
uniform measure on the surface. Thus, suppose points are generated on the surface of
the sphere by some mathematical algorithm. If the points are generated in such a way
that their distribution is given by the density cos θ on all meridian circles in M, then
the distribution of the generated points will be uniform on the surface of the sphere.
To formulate this negatively: If we choose a generating algorithm that produces points
on all meridian circles according to the uniform distribution in the latitude variable θ ,
then the points will not be uniformly distributed on the sphere—simply because the
meridian circles are positioned on the sphere in a very specific way: unlike the parallel,
disjoint circles in O, the meridian circles are not disjoint: they all have the same North
and South Poles in common, which entails that they are “crammed” around the poles.
Hence, if the points are generated uniformly in θ on all meridian circles, then more
points are generated closer to the poles, and thus the points generated this way will
accumulate more around the poles. This makes perfect intuitive sense and can in fact
be illustrated by computer simulation (Weisstein 2015).
That the A-conditional expectation and hence the (A, qA)-conditional probability
distribution on a single, fixed great circle C is undetermined if A is the four element
Boolean algebra consisting of C , its complement, the empty set and the whole sphere,
also is correct intuitively: the spherewith its uniform surfacemeasure can be a perfectly
good probabilistic model of the behavior of the mathematical algorithm in the sense
described, together with any behavior of the algorithm on the fixed, single great circle
C—precisely becauseC is measure zero in the surfacemeasure. In other words, saying
that the surface measure is a good probabilistic model of the algorithm simply does
not contain enough information to infer probabilistically that the algorithm behaves
in any particular way on the specified great circle C . Furthermore, it is clear that
this behavior cannot be found out via any a priori reasoning (such as some form of
Principle of Indifference for instance). One just would have to look at the specific
algorithm generating the points on the sphere and see what distribution it generates
on that particular C . Whatever this distribution is, it can however be accommodated
as conditional probability using the theory of conditional expectations by taking the
appropriate version of the A-conditional expectation.
One also can envisage a scenario in which the sphere with its uniform measure
is the model not of objective frequencies but of subjective degrees of beliefs (cre-
dences). Rescorla’s recent paper Rescorla (2014) analyzes the Borel–Kolmogorov
Paradox from this perspective, and Easwaran’s defusing of the paradox also is under
the subjective interpretation Easwaran (2008). Rescorla’s main claim is that “The
Borel–Kolmogorov paradox is a Fregean ‘paradox of identity’.” (Rescorla 2014,
p. 16) In harmony with this, Rescorla embraces (Rescorla 2014, p. 14) the condi-
tional probabilities’ sensitive dependence on the conditioning σ -field as a sign of
subjective degrees of beliefs’ dependence on how the events are represented to the
agent. In his view this dependence is not irrational because
Credences are rationally sensitive to the way that one represents an event, so it is
not surprising that different conditional probabilities arise when one represents
the conditioning event differently. (Rescorla 2014, p. 16)
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An assessment of Rescorla’s proposal would require going into the details of the
Fregean paradox of identity, together with an explication of the nature of credences
and with an elaboration of the relation of credences to probability theory, which we
cannot undertake here. But we agree with Rescorla’s general methodological stand:
that the analysis of the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox should take into account how
one interprets probability (Rescorla 2014, p. 14) (in our terminology: what the appli-
cation of probability theory is). The application described in this section is under
the objective, frequency interpretation, which Rescorla leaves for others to analyze
(Rescorla 2014, p. 14). We have seen that under this interpretation of probability both
the (O, qO)-conditional and the (M, qM)-conditional distributions on the great circle
are intuitively correct. Thus, although for reasons different from his, we also agree
with Rescorla that “. . . the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox is not remotely paradoxical.”
(Rescorla 2014, p. 17)
8 Closing comments
The Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox was formulated by Borel in 1909, at a time, when
the conceptual foundations of probability theory were not yet entirely clear. In par-
ticular, the notion of conditional probability was then restricted to the Bayes’ rule,
which is a very special and limited concept, not revealing the real conceptual structure
of conditionalization. It was only as a result of Kolmogorov’s work that the abstract
conceptual structure of probability theory and of conditionalization became clarified.
Kolmogorov’s workwas the result of a long development (seeDoob 1996 for themajor
conceptual steps in the history of rigorous probability theory), and its significance is
not just that it is the natural end of a long development but that it is the beginning
of a new phase of probability theory: Kolmogorov’s work established a link between
probability theory and functional analysis. This opened the way for developing proba-
bilistic concepts that are indispensable in probabilistic modeling of certain phenomena
(martingales, stochastic processes). The notion of conditional expectation is crucial
in this further development in probability theory.
The starting point of our analysis of the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox in this paper
was adopting theKolmogorovian view,which is standard in today’s probability theory:
that the suitable technical device of conditionalization is the concept of conditional
expectation. The main goal of the theory of conditional expectations
. . . is the systematic development of a notion of conditional probability that
covers conditioning with respect to events of probability 0. This is accomplished
by conditioning with respect to collections of events—that is, with respect to σ -
fields. (Billingsley 1995, p. 432).
The concept of conditional expectation with respect to a σ -field was developed by
Kolmogorov (1933) soon after the main tool for it, the Radon–Nikodym theorem, had
been found in 1930, and Kolmogorov’s resolution of the Borel Paradox is also based
on the idea of emphasizing conditioning with respect to σ -fields:
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[The Borel Paradox] shows that the concept of a conditional probability with
regard to an isolated given hypothesiswhose probability equals 0 is inadmissible.
For we can obtain a probability distribution [...] on the meridian circle only if
we regard this circle as an element of a decomposition of the entire spherical
surface into meridian circles with the given poles. (Kolmogorov 1933, p. 51)
Kolmogorov’s wording of his resolution of the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox is slightly
misleading however because it makes the impression that only by taking the σ -field
M generated by (measurable sets of) meridian circles and calculating the conditional
probabilities using the conditional expectation this σ -field defines (obtaining this way
the non-uniform distribution on meridian circles) will yield a conditional probability
on a great circle that is intuitively correct. We have seen however that one also can
take the σ -field O generated by (measurable sets of) circles parallel to a given great
circle and compute the corresponding conditional probabilities.Doing this, one obtains
different but intuitively not less correct conditional probabilities. It does not make
sense to ask “Which one of the σ -fields M and O define the ‘correct’ conditional
probabilities?” The algebras M andO represent different conditioning circumstances
and the conditional probabilities they lead to are answers to different questions—
not different answers to the same question. In certain applications M, in certain other
applicationsO might represent some circumstances that are described correctly by the
corresponding conditional probabilities. This is an advantage, showing the flexibility
of probability theory in modeling phenomena. Thus worries about the dependence
of conditional probabilities on the conditioning algebras seem to us to be misguided.
There is no “absolute” notion of conditional probability—conditional probabilities are
truly conditional: they depend on a full set of conditions, i.e. on a σ -field. This is so
also when one uses Bayes’ rule to calculate conditional probabilities; in this specific
case the dependence of the conditional probability on the full four element Boolean
subalgebra generated by the single conditioning random event featuring in Bayes’ rule
is just not quite transparent.
Thus, under close and careful scrutiny, the “paradox” in the Borel–Kolmogorov
Paradox evaporates: There is no clash between the correct intuition about what the
conditional probabilities with respect to probability zero events are and the technically
proper concept of conditionalization via conditional expectation.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Computing the (O, qO)-conditional probability on a great circle
Keeping the notations (in particular the polar coordinates) introduced in Sect. 4, we
verify that that E(· | O) given by (72) is a version of the O-conditional expectation.
Note first that, according to standard integral transformation theorems, for all inte-
grable functions f we have
∫
S
f dμ =
∫ π
0
∫ 2π
0
f
(
φ, θ
) ·
∣∣∣∣ ∂(x, y, z)∂(φ, θ, r)
∣∣∣∣ dφdθ (92)
where μ is the surface measure on the sphere S and
∣∣∣ ∂(x,y,z)∂(φ,θ,r)
∣∣∣ is the absolute value of
the Jacobian determinant
∣∣∣∣ ∂(x, y, z)∂(φ, θ, r)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
cosφ sin θ −r sin φ sin θ r cosφ sin θ
sin φ sin θ r cosφ sin θ r sin φ cos θ
cos θ 0 −r sin θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= r2 sin θ (for 0 ≤ θ ≤ π) (93)
(Note that if 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2π , then
∣∣∣ ∂(x,y,z)∂(φ,θ,r)
∣∣∣ = r2| sin θ |). The volume of the unit sphere
is 2π thus after normalizing the surface measure we get
∫
S
f dμ =
∫
S
f
dν
2π
= 1
2π
∫ π
0
∫ 2π
0
f (φ, θ) · sin θ dφdθ (94)
We have to verify that, for Z = [0, 2π ] × A in O we have
∫
Z
E( f | O) dμ =
∫
Z
f dμ (95)
The calculation:
∫
Z
E( f | O) dμ = 1
2π
∫
A
∫ 2π
0
E( f | O) sin θ dφdθ (96)
= 1
2π
∫
A
∫ 2π
0
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
f (φ, θ) dφ sin θ dφdθ (97)
= 1
2π
∫
A
sin θ
2π
∫ 2π
0
∫ 2π
0
f (φ, θ) dφ dφdθ (98)
= 1
2π
∫
A
sin θ
∫ 2π
0
f (φ, θ) dφdθ (99)
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= 1
2π
∫
A
∫ 2π
0
f (φ, θ) · sin θ dφdθ (100)
=
∫
Z
f dμ (101)
Appendix 2: Computing the (M, qM)-conditional probability on a great circle
Again, we have to verify that E(· | M) given by (81) is a version of theM-conditional
expectation. This requires to show that for Z = A × [0, π ] ∈ M (where A is sym-
metric) we have
∫
Z
E( f | M) dμ =
∫
Z
f dμ (102)
The calculation:
∫
Z
E( f | M) dμ = 1
2π
∫ π
0
∫
A
E( f | M) sin θ dφdθ (103)
= 1
2π
∫ π
0
∫
A
1
2
∫ 2π
0
f (φ, θ)| sin θ | dθ sin θ dφdθ (104)
= 1
2π
∫ π
0
sin θ
2
∫
A
∫ 2π
0
f (φ, θ)| sin θ | dθ dφdθ (105)
= 1
2π
∫ π
0
sin θ
2
· 2
∫
A
∫ π
0
f (φ, θ) sin θ dθ dφdθ (106)
= 1
2π
∫ π
0
sin θ dθ ·
∫
A
∫ π
0
f (φ, θ) sin θ dθ dφ (107)
= 1
2π
∫
A
∫ π
0
f (φ, θ) sin θ dθ dφ (108)
= 1
2π
∫ π
0
∫
A
f (φ, θ) sin θ dφ dθ (109)
=
∫
Z
f dμ (110)
Remark 6 If we define the σ -algebra M′ as the set of all meridian and half-meridian
circles:
M′ = {A × [0, π ] : A ⊆ [0, 2π ] is measurable} (111)
(with A not necessarily symmetric), then the M′-conditional expectation is given by
E( f | M′)(φ, θ) =
∫ π
0
f (φ, θ) sin θ dθ (112)
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This is verified by the following equations:
∫
Z
E( f | M′) dμ = 1
2π
∫ π
0
∫
A
E( f | M′) sin θ dφdθ (113)
= 1
2π
∫ π
0
∫
A
∫ π
0
f (φ, θ) sin θ dθ sin θ dφdθ (114)
= 1
2π
∫ π
0
sin θ dθ ·
∫
A
∫ π
0
f (φ, θ) sin θ dθ dφ (115)
= 1
2π
∫
A
∫ π
0
f (φ, θ) sin θ dθ dφ (116)
= 1
2π
∫ π
0
∫
A
f (φ, θ) sin θ dφ dθ (117)
=
∫
Z
f dμ (118)
Appendix 3: The group-theoretic relation of the sphere and of a great circle on
the sphere
The two-dimensional sphere possesses a symmetry represented by the topological
group SO(3) of rotations in the three dimensional Euclidean space; however, the
sphere itself cannot be considered as a topological group [see Megía (2007) and
references there]. If by “uniform measure on the sphere” we mean the σ -additive
Lebesgue measure, then this can be defined as the unique measure on the sphere
which is invariant with respect to the action of SO(3) on the sphere. While this seems
intuitively obvious, it is in fact a non-trivial mathematical theorem having a non-
trivial proof; furthermore, it is an open problem whether the σ -additive uniform Borel
measure on the sphere also is the unique measure invariant with respect to SO(3)
(Kharazishvili 1997).
Any great circle also possesses a symmetry represented by the group SO(2) of
rotations in the two dimensional plane of the circle; in fact the circle can be identified
with the group SO(2) itself. The intuitive argument showing that the sphere itself
cannot be viewed as the topological group SO(3) whereas the circle can be identified
with SO(2) is that if we designate some special point of the circle, then every rotation
of the circle is uniquely identified by the point that this special point is sent to, while
if we designate some special point of the sphere, then a rotation of the sphere is not
uniquely identified by the point that this special point is sent to, because we can rotate
around the axis through this special point as well. SO(2) is a compact topological
group and can be thought of as a “subgroup” of SO(3), although, strictly speaking
SO(2) is not a subgroup of SO(3): the group SO(3) is the set of 3× 3 matrices having
unit determinant, SO(2) is the set of 2×2 matrices having unit determinant, thus these
groups have different unit elements e3 and e2, respectively. But SO(2) can be embedded
into SO(3) by an injective group homomorphism h; elements of the form e3 · h(g)
in SO(3), with g ∈ SO(2) form a subgroup. Since on every compact topological
group there exists a unique group invariant normalized measure, the so-called Haar
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measure, there exists a unique rotational invariant measure on SO(2)—this is the
length measure on the circle. Standard references for the Haar measure are Nachbin
(1965) and Halmos (1950, Chap. XI), for a more recent presentation see Deitmar and
Echterhoff (2009)).
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